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Abstract 
Neighbourhood renewal programs have transformed crime reduction strategies in 
many developed countries. These place-based initiatives emphasise the preventative 
value of multi-agency work to enhance community safety and social inclusion. The 
purpose of this paper is to present empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
neighbourhood renewal programs by estimating the impact of the UK’s 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) program on crime rates across England 
between 2000 and 2007. Because the NRF was only made available to the most 
deprived local areas in England, we are able to estimate its effects using a 
Differences-in-Differences (DiD) approach and a Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
design. Our DiD estimates indicate that the NRF led to improvements in the rates of 
property and violent crime of between 10-25%, with analysis of treatment intensity 
effects suggesting that for every £1 per capita of NRF monies, crime rates improved 
by 0.3-0.6%. Our RD estimates reveal that these improvements are especially strong 
around the threshold for program eligibility – a finding that is particularly robust for 
reductions in property crime. Furthermore, using a spatial DiD, we identify the 
diffusion of crime prevention benefits from areas receiving NRF funding to 
neighbouring areas that did not receive funding. Our results therefore suggest that 
neighbourhood renewal programs are effective strategies for reducing crime.   
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Neighbourhood renewal programs are place-based interventions for the regeneration 
of distressed urban areas, and are a common tool of economic development policy in 
North America, Europe and elsewhere (Carmon, 1999; Couch, et al., 2008; Givord et 
al., 2017; Gonzalez-Pampillón et al., 2017; Judd & Parkinson, 1990). Central to most 
renewal programs is a recognition of the need for partnerships between public, 
private and non-profit agencies to address the deep-seated problems facing 
disadvantaged communities (Bailey et al., 1995; van Gent et al., 2009). Private-led 
actions to encourage co-ordinated strategies can play an important role in driving the 
renewal of distressed urban areas (see, e.g., Brooks, 2008; Cook & MacDonald, 
2011; MacDonald et al., 2013). Nevertheless, government-sponsored multi-agency 
place-based programs, such as Federal Empowerment Zones (Busso et al., 2013), 
have also been implemented to promote sustainable community development in a 
number of countries. One high-profile example of such a place-based program was 
the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF), which aimed at narrowing the gap in 
social and economic outcomes between the most deprived local areas and the rest of 
England.  
The NRF involved the transfer of significant resources to local agencies as a 
way of enabling them to address the long-term social and economic problems in the 
most disadvantaged areas across England. It provided about £1.875bn throughout the 
period 2001 to 2006 to deprived local areas, and a further £525m for the year 
2007/08 (Cowen et al., 2008). Local areas identified as being among the top 50 most 
deprived areas in England on any one of six key measures of deprivation were 
eligible for the NRF. On this basis, 81 out of 345 local areas across England received 















This paper focuses on crime reduction, one of the major goals of the NRF, for 
two key reasons. First, notwithstanding long-standing debates about the structural 
embeddedness and intractability of crime (Garland, 1996), the reduction of criminal 
activity is still regarded as a fundamental concern for government. Crime is among 
the most serious problems faced by neighbourhoods (Brooks, 2008). It is detrimental 
to economic prosperity, a significant drain on the public purse, harms the quality of 
life of victims (and perpetrators), and can instigate a vicious circle of social and 
economic decline in the communities in which it is most prevalent (Becker, 1968; 
Freeman, 1999). Second, crime is one of the few goals of the NRF for which 
measures were consistently recorded over time at the local area level for the period 
under study. Data on rates of burglary, vehicle crime, robbery, violence and sexual 
offences were published at the local level by the UK Home Office from 2000 
onwards, and we are able to utilise these indicators to identify the effects of 
participation in the NRF. 
Place-based policies generally seek to improve the quality of life for residents 
living in disadvantaged areas (Ladd, 1994). Initiatives intended to redevelop and 
regenerate distressed urban areas through co-ordinated action by multiple agencies 
have therefore focused on community as well as economic development (Neumark & 
Simpson, 2015). Prior research on multi-agency neighbourhood renewal programs 
shows that they can bring stakeholders together to generate better social and 
economic outcomes within disadvantaged areas (e.g. Roberts et al., 2017). However, 
systematic empirical research on the effectiveness of neighbourhood renewal 
programs is surprisingly scarce. Preliminary evaluations of the NRF suggested that it 














rest (see, Cowen et al, 2008; Amion Consulting, 2010; Lupton et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, these evaluations are based on descriptive or qualitative analysis, 
meaning that the findings should be treated with great caution. Robust empirical 
evidence on the impact of the NRF, would therefore cast valuable light on the 
relative merits of neighbourhood renewal programs more generally. 
In this study, we estimate the impact of the NRF on crime by analysing the 
rates of property and violent crime across 345 local areas in England between 2000 
and 2007 – during which time the NRF was implemented. To do so, we employ a 
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach to estimate the average effect of the NRF 
on crime rates, a continuous treatment variable strategy to account for potential 
differences in “treatment intensity”, and a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design to 
estimate the local effect of the NRF around the threshold for program eligibility.  
Our DiD estimates suggest that the NRF lead to improved community safety 
in those disadvantaged areas benefitting from the additional resources allocated to 
them through the NRF. Furthermore, the treatment intensity results indicate that the 
amount of NRF monies received by each local area is an important predictor of both 
property and violent crime rates, while RD estimates reveal that these positive effects 
are especially strong around the program eligibility threshold, particularly for 
property crime. The additional activities undertaken by local agencies in receipt of 
NRF funding may therefore have been responsible for the reductions in property 
crime that we observe and for preventing violent crime. The positive program effects 
that we identify are substantively important and are resistant to a number of 
robustness checks. Moreover, using a spatial DiD, we find evidence of the diffusion 
of crime prevention benefits from areas receiving NRF funding to neighbouring areas 














the potential to contribute to debates about the effectiveness of neighbourhood 
renewal programs.    
 In the following section, we discuss the background to the NRF program. The 
subsequent section describes the empirical strategy that we employ, including 
information on the data, methods and estimators that comprise our research design. 
Thereafter, we present the results of the analyses that we undertake, before 
concluding with a discussion of the implications of the study. 
 
2. The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) in England  
The NRF was the principal funding mechanism within the UK government’s 
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) introduced in 2000 
(Dickinson, 2014). The overarching aim of the NSNR was to reverse the decline of 
deprived areas across England by: ‘marshalling a coalition of policies, resources and 
people behind a single Strategy which will focus on: reviving local economies; 
reviving communities; ensuring decent services; and leadership and joint working’ 
(Social Exclusion Unit, 2000: 42).  
Local areas were eligible to receive NRF resources if they were within the top 
50 most deprived areas on any of the six Indices of Multiple Deprivation for the year 
2000 (IMD2000), namely: the employment scale (the number of people who are 
unable to work due to unemployment, sickness or disability); the income scale (the 
number of people in receipt of means-tested welfare benefits); the average of ward 
scores (the population weighted average of the combined employment and income 
scales for the neighbourhoods in an area); the average of ward ranks (the population 
weighted average of the combined employment and income ranks for the 














population living in neighbourhoods which rank within the most deprived 10% of 
neighbourhoods in the country); and, local concentration (the population weighted 
average of the ranks of an area’s most deprived neighbourhoods that contain exactly 
10% of the area’s population).  
To regenerate disadvantaged local economies and to reconstruct (or rebuild) 
the most deprived areas in England, NRF resources were given to the Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) responsible for all the social and economic outcomes within 
those areas. LSPs receiving NRF monies were then set targets for delivering 
improvements on a range of indicators; in particular, crime rates, high school test 
scores, employment rates, housing quality and mortality rates. At that time, all LSPs 
liased closely with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) that brought 
together representatives of the police, local authorities, probation services, health 
authorities, and private and non-profit sector organizations within each local area to 
coordinate crime prevention strategies.1 LSPs receiving the NRF directed, on 
average, about 20% of the total funding allocation to CDRPs (Amion Consultion, 
2010: Cowen et al., 2008).  
It is important to highlight here that, due to the un-hypothecated nature of the 
NRF allocations, it is conceivable that the percentages allocated to crime prevention 
may have differed slightly across areas. Nevertheless, LSPs were required to work 
with UK central government to agree a ‘statement of use’ indicating how the NRF 
resources would be deployed. Hence, the central government played a critical role in 
                                                          
1 As a result of the 2000 Local Government Act, LSPs were established across England to develop a 
community strategy for each local area. Within this context, CDRPs were made responsible for 
formulating and implementing initiatives that would contribute to LSPs crime reduction objectives. 
The territories served by LSPs and CDRPs were coterminous with those for the 345 local government 
areas across England, with CDRPs having been established by law in all of those areas in 1998. 
Drawing on the UK Census 2001, the size of the areas served by CDRPs varied from 12.13 Km2 
(London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) to 2407.63 Km2 (East Riding of Yorkshire), and from 
24,457 inhabitants (Teesdale) to 977,087 inhabitants (Birmingham). For more information about the 














regulating and monitoring the allocation of the NRF across England, which is likely 
to have restricted variations in use of NRF monies. In addition to achieving better 
outcomes in absolute terms, it was envisaged that the NRF would reduce the gap 
between deprived areas and the rest of the country. If LSPs were judged to be 
ineffective or failing in addressing the NRF objectives, UK central government 
reserved the right to intervene in the management of the funds and if necessary to use 
alternative institutional means for their disbursement (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001). 
For the above reasons, we do not expect there to have been substantial differences in 
the relative priority accorded to crime reduction across LSPs receiving NRF 
resources. 
Within this context, CDRP actions intended to improve crime rates were 
focused on preventative and community safety initiatives. Examples of such 
additional activities funded by the NRF, included: target hardening (e.g. security 
improvements to public spaces); enhancement of visible policing presence (e.g. more 
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and street wardens); youth diversion 
activity (e.g. extra-curricular activities and support) and risk offending management 
(e.g. acceptable behaviour contracts) (Cowen et al., 2008: pp. 27). There are sound 
theoretical reasons for anticipating that these types of social and situational crime 
prevention interventions help to decrease criminal activity (see, for example, Becker, 
1968; Sutherland & Cressey, 1978; Cohen & Felson, 1979). Nevertheless, the 
empirical evidence on the efficacy of social preventative crime measures is still 
mixed.  
Some estimates of changes in police presence suggest that an increase in 
police numbers can result in a corresponding decrease in property and violent crime 














Vollaard & Koning, 2009). Likewise, estimates of the impact of youth diversion 
programs suggest that young people benefitting from such schemes are between 1.5 
to 2.5 times less likely to reoffend (see, e.g., Gensheimer et al., 1986; Wilson & 
Hoge, 2013), and estimates of target hardening initiatives such as surveillance 
cameras suggest a reduction in crime of about 25% (see, Priks, 2015).2  
As a place-based initiative, the NRF program was utilised by participants to 
resource a wide range of crime prevention activities, as well as numerous actions 
intended to improve health, employment and education outcomes. Evaluations of 
other multi-faceted placed-based policies have found that they can improve crime 
rates (e.g. Brooks, 2008; Hoyt, 2005), though the specific mechanisms through 
which this occurs are not precisely identified. However, research on crime prevention 
strategies that seek to pull multiple levers simultaneously suggests that the effects of 
such multi-pronged approaches are likely to be more modest and diffuse than those 
for more narrow and focused initiatives (e.g. Cook, 2012). Hence, while we did 
anticipate a positive overall program effect for the NRF, we were uncertain whether 
this would be comparable to that potentially observed for the specific actions CDRPs 
might undertake, but due to data limitations we were unable to evaluate.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Data 
To estimate the potential effect of the NRF program on crime reduction, we collected 
data from 345 local areas for the period 2000-2007, 81 of which received NRF 
resources.3 The analysis presented here focuses on publicly available measures of 
                                                          
2 For a useful review of the literature on crime deterrence policies we refer the reader to Chalfin and 
McCrary, 2017 
3 As discussed, local areas in England within the top 50 most deprived areas on any of the six 














crime that were collected as part of the police recorded crime series published by the 
UK’s Home Office. To assess the impact of the NRF program, we draw upon 
measures of property and violent crime.4 We estimate separate models for the 
following crimes against property: domestic burglary, measured as the number of 
burglaries in a dwelling recorded by the police per 1,000 households in each area, 
and vehicle crime and robbery, measured as the number of such offences per 1,000 
population.5 For violent crimes, we analyse violence against the person and sexual 
offences per 1,000 population. These indicators are particularly appropriate for our 
analysis, not only because they reflect key NSNR priorities regarding crime 
reduction (Lupton et al., 2013), but also because they capture the focus on social 
(dis)order that influenced much of the UK Labour government's neighbourhood 
renewal agenda in the 2000s (Levitas, 2005).6  
Table 1 summarizes the baseline characteristics of English local areas by 
program participation status. The following characteristics are included from the 
2001 UK Census: the average earnings (£ per week) of employees in the area; the 
percentage of young people in each local area grouped into three age categories (25-
                                                                                                                                                                    
across England were eligible to receive funding from the financial year 2001/02, when the scheme 
was inaugurated, to the financial year 2007/08, when the scheme was closed. It is important to note, 
however, that the UK Government proposed that at the start of the program seven further local areas 
that were among the top 50 most deprived areas according to the 1998 Index of Local Deprivation 
should also receive transitional protection/funding for three years (Tunstall & Lupton, 2003). The 
transitional nature of the funding received by those seven areas may bias our results, hence we have 
excluded those areas from the sample used for our analysis. 
4 Crime is generally divided in the economics literature into property and violent crime (see, e.g., 
Doyle et al., 1999; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Gibbons, 2004; Levitt, 1997, among others), so we follow 
that convention and group our crime measures into those dimensions of crime. 
5 Although robbery is defined by the UK Office for National Statistics as “an offence in which 
violence or the threat of violence is used during a theft", it is not recorded by the police in England as 
violence against the person. 
6 It is important to acknowledge the limitations of crime statistics based on police records, since they 
may understate the incidence of crime, which is known in the criminology literature as the “dark 
figure” of non-reported and/or non-recorded crime (Biderman & Reiss, 1967). For England, studies 
have flagged substantial discrepancies between victimisation surveys, such as the British Crime 
Survey (BCS), and police recorded statistics, indicating that many crimes are not reported or recorded 
by the police (see, Maguire, 2012). Although our data likely underestimate the actual rate of crime, 
formal reporting of such incidents arguably reflects their relative seriousness (see, Tarling & Morris, 














29 years, 20-24 years, and 15-19 years); the percentage of low skilled people; an 
indicator of ethnic diversity; population density; and an indicator of population 
concentration. According to the table, while both groups of local areas seem 
relatively similar in terms of average income, areas that received NRF funding have 
a larger proportion of low skilled and young residents, higher population density, a 
higher number of residents concentrated in a small number of neighbourhoods, and 
are more diverse in terms of residents’ ethnicity. It should be noted that although 
there are clear cross-sectional differences between areas receiving NRF resources 
and those that were not eligible for funding, our research design should not be 
affected by those differences (see section 3.2). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
To provide a sense of the study’s geographical context, Figure 1 shows the 
spatial distribution of the amount of NRF monies received per capita for each 
program participant, and Figure 2 shows the change in crime rates for all measures of 
criminal activity analysed in our study. In addition, Table 2 reports summary 
statistics for the number of criminal offenses before and after the NRF 
implementation. The table shows that local areas receiving NRF monies have much 
higher average crime rates before 2002, which is not surprising since the NRF 
program addressed the most deprived areas in England, deprivation being 
consistently associated with crime incidence (e.g. Kawachi et al., 1999). After 2002, 
the average change in crime rates diverges for each group. In particular, domestic 
burglaries, vehicle theft and robbery offences in local areas receiving NRF funding 














regards violent crime, our data suggest that there was an increase for both crime 
measures, though violent crime rates rose less in local areas receiving NRF 
resources. Overall, the results in Table 2 seem to indicate that the NRF had a positive 
effect on reducing crime victimization. 
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 Methods 
We use three different empirical approaches in this paper, a DiD approach, a 
continuous treatment variable strategy, and a RD design. We begin by estimating the 
following generalized DiD model that includes area fixed effects to estimate the 
impact of the NRF program on crime rates: 
 (1) 
where yit represents crime outcomes, i.e., domestic burglary, vehicle crime, robbery, 
violence and sexual offences, for year t (t = 2000, …, 2007) in local area i (i = 1, …, 
345), αi denotes local area fixed effects, and δt represents time (yearly) effects. Dit is 
a binary indicator equal to one for those areas being treated after year 2001, and zero 
otherwise. In mathematical notation, Dit = (treatedi * dt), where treatedi is a dummy 
variable coded one for participants in the NRF program and zero for those areas non-
eligible for funding, and dt is a time dummy that switches on for post 2001 
observations, i.e., after the NRF program was introduced. 7  In this model 
specification, the fixed effects control for time-invariant differences in crime rates 
                                                          
7 It should be noted that local areas started to receive NRF monies from mid-2001 onwards, hence our 














due to unobserved factors that differ across local areas, while time effects control for 
common time shocks affecting all areas.  
As discussed, although there might be cross-sectional differences between 
program participants and non-participants, the DiD identification strategy rests on the 
assumption that both groups would have followed a common trend in crime rates in 
the absence of the NRF program. To investigate the common trend assumption, we 
undertake Mora and Reggio’s (2015) parallel-trends test to establish if there are 
systematic pre-treatment trend differences between both groups.8 For all crime 
outcomes, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of common pre-treatment dynamics 
(p-values equal to 0.90, 0.79, 0.83, 0.90, and 0.85, for the DiD models predicting 
domestic burglary, vehicle theft, robbery, violence against the person and sexual 
offences, respectively).  
In addition to identifying an average treatment effect on the program 
participants the generalized DiD approach enables us to exploit the time variation in 
our data. More specifically, we extend our analysis by deploying a model including 
lead and lagged effects to explore whether NRF effects changed over time. Formally: 
 (2) 
Leads and lags in Eq. (2) are a series of dummy variables, where each lead is 
set to one if local area i will be eligible for the NRF program j years in the future and 
zero otherwise; the estimates of γj measure, therefore, potential lead effects, capturing 
                                                          
8 We perform the parallel-trend test using the STATA command “dqd” developed by Mora and 
Reggio (2015). The command “dqd” calculates the test with a null of the parallel paths based on 
auxiliary regressions in which year dummies are interacted with the treatment dummy. Rejection of 














non-parallel trends (if any) on crime outcomes between program participants and 
non-participants before the NRF implementation. Similarly, lags are dummy 
variables for each year j following the NRF implementation, where ρj measure the 
lagged effects of the NRF program and tests whether the effects are sustained, 
decrease or increase over time. 
A potential disadvantage of the above approaches is the assumption that 
"treatment" is a binary outcome, i.e. both strategies consider that program effects 
within the treated areas would be the same. It is conceivable, however, that the NRF 
effects on crime might not be homogenous across program participants. Therefore, 
an alternative way to measure the program effect is to replace the binary treatment 
group variable in model (1) with a continuous treatment variable.  More specifically, 




here, the intensity of treatment for program participants (TIit) is proxied by the 
amount of NRF funding per inhabitant for each local area i in year t. The total 
amount of NRF monies allocated to each local area was determined by the UK 
central government. More specifically, the amount of funding allocated to each local 
area was related to the number of local residents living in deprived neighbourhoods, 
hence treatment intensity, like program participation, was not self-determined by the 
local areas but was determined by the UK Central government. 
As a fourth step, we complement the generalized DiD results by estimating a 
number of RD models after the NRF implementation. The nature of the NRF 














treatment effect around the threshold.9 As mentioned above, local areas were eligible 
to receive funding if they were among the top 50 most deprived areas on any of the 
six indices in the IMD2000. When multiple rating scores determine assignment to 
only two treatment conditions, i.e. treated or non-treated, a “single” rating score can 
be created that alone determines treatment assignment, the so-called “binding score” 
approach (see, Reardon & Robinson, 2012). Hence, to reduce the 
multidimensionality of the problem, we propose here to create a new deprivation 
variable to capture the binding score. 
As noted in section 2, the eligibility of local areas for the NRF is based on six 
individual indices of deprivation, i.e., employment scale, income scale, average of 
ward scores, average of ward ranks, extent, and local concentration. Because the 
NRF was made available only to areas among the top 50 most deprived on these 
indices of socio-economic disadvantage, the program represents an ideal setting for 
the application of quasi-experimental methods. The distribution of the six indices of 
deprivation, however, varies substantially, differing also in the unit of measurement. 
For these reasons, we need to deploy a standardization strategy in order to make the 
six different indices comparable. In doing so, we consider the conventional 
standardization approach given by the following expression: 
 (4) 
where wik is the deprivation of local area i in index k, μk is the mean of the index of 
deprivation k, and σk its standard deviation. Once the six deprivation indices are 
standardized, we construct a new rating variable (Xi) defined as the maximum of the 
difference between the individual indices and the cut-off of each dimension (i.e., the 
                                                          
9 A detailed explanation of RD designs can be found in Angrist and Pischke (2008), Imbens and 














value for the 50th most deprived local area).  The rationale behind the choice of this 
functional form is that the distance from the threshold would be comparable for each 
rating score (Robinson, 2011; Reardon & Robinson, 2012). Formally, 
 (5) 
where X is a continuous variable that perfectly determines program participation, zik 
is the standardised value of the deprivation index k in local area i and z(50)k is the cut-
off of index k. Following Reardon and Robinson (2012: 96), given X, we can use 
single rating RD methods to estimate the effect of the NRF program on crime.10  
 As in our DiD models, our outcome variables of interest are the five 
indicators of crime victimization (yit). Local areas are assigned to the treatment status 
if the running or forcing variable (Xi) is equal or greater than the cut-off point or 
threshold, i.e. if , hence . In our RD analysis, we use a non-
parametric local polynomial approach with a triangular kernel, optimal bandwidth 
selection and robust confidence intervals as described in Calonico et al. (2014). 
Specifically, we estimate the following local linear polynomial approach: 
 (6) 
where the estimate of τ is our coefficient of interest, which approximates the effect 
on crime of the NRF program at the cut-off. To estimate this model, we first restrict 
the sample to local areas within some optimal bandwidth11, and then estimate a 
weighted least-squares regression with a triangular kernel weighting function. To 
evaluate our results’ robustness, we also report RD estimates using different 
polynomial orders and alternative kernel functions in Appendix B. 
                                                          
10 To check the sensitivity of our results to alternative binding scores, we report RD estimates in 
Appendix A using different standardization approaches and different functional forms of Eq. (5). 
11 In this paper, we follow Calonico et al. (2017) and use data-driven optimal bandwidths such as 














Identification in RD designs relies on the assumption that individuals cannot 
manipulate the treatment assignment variable, or running variable (Lee & Lemieux, 
2010). In our context, assignment manipulation is unlikely to happen given the 
nature of the eligibility rule. First, deprivation indices are constructed by the UK 
central government based on official statistics. Secondly, the eligibility rule was 
based on deprivation scores constructed and made publicly available before the NRF 
announcement. Nevertheless, to add confidence in our approach, we formally 
evaluate the assumption of absence of manipulation by means of the test developed 
by Cattaneo et al. (2018), which extends the continuity test first proposed by 
McCrary (2008). This tests the null hypothesis of continuity of the running variable 
around the threshold by means of a local polynomial distribution regression 
approach. Using three different polynomial degrees the results of this analysis 
indicate that there is no evidence of discontinuity around the threshold (p-values 
equal to 0.533, 0.102 and 0.324, using polynomials of order one, two and three, 
respectively). 
To conclude this section, it is important to note that DiD and RD models do 
not estimate the same quantities. DID estimates are usually interpreted as the relative 
effects of a policy on treatment versus control groups, while RD estimates are 
generally interpreted as local average treatment effects around the threshold. Hence, 
program effects estimated with the RD approach are based on differences between 
areas immediately above and below the thresholds determining program participation 
status, while DiD estimates should capture the program effects on all of the 
participating areas.  Therefore, although RD designs are potentially more credible, in 
terms of identification, than alternative strategies such as DiD (Lee & Lemieux, 














estimates outside the neighbourhood of the threshold. This combination of 
identification strategies is being increasingly deployed in policy/program evaluation 
studies using observational data (see, e.g., Feng et al., 2018; Hanson & Rohlin, 2017; 
Kogan et al., 2016; Meghir et al., 2018, among others).  
 
4. Results 
In this section, we begin by assessing the impact of the NRF program on property 
and violent crime using the generalized DiD models described above, before 
presenting and discussing estimates of RD models. 
 
4.1. Difference-in-differences results 
The results of our DiD analyses (Eq. 1) are reported in the two panels of Table 3. 
Panel A presents estimates from models predicting property crime, while Panel B 
shows the results from DiD models predicting violent crime. Overall, the results 
suggest crime rates in local areas participating in the NRF program fell faster than in 
“non-treated” areas. Starting with the NRF effect on property crimes, DiD estimates 
suggest that the NRF program is associated with a reduction of domestic burglary 
victimisation by about 13% (95% CI [-0.18, -0.07]), vehicle crime incidence by 
about 9% (95% CI [-0.14, -0.06]), and robbery by about 24% (95% CI [-0.31, -
0.18]).  When we turn to violent crime, the results are very similar in both magnitude 
and significance; our results show that receiving NRF monies is associated with a 
positive effect in terms of preventing violence against the person (β=-0.12; 95% CI [-
0.20, -0.04]), and sexual offences (β=-0.15; 95% CI [-0.22, -0.09]). Since violent 
crime was rising across England at this time, the estimates indicate that it did so at a 















[Table 3 about here] 
 
The initial DiD specification presented above provides no information about 
treatment dynamics. In other words, our first model does not indicate whether the 
effect of the NRF program on crime varies over time. Analysis of the effect 
dynamics might help to better understand the impact of the NRF program. To 
explore these dynamics, Figure 3 visually depicts estimates for the leads and lags 
model described in Eq. (2).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Looking first at the parallel trend assumption, our results suggest that there 
are no anticipatory effects or differences between both groups before 2002 in any of 
the estimated models. It should be highlighted, however, that although leads and lags 
models, and Mora and Regio’s test both point to the absence of differential pre-
treatment trends, given the low number of pre-treatment periods we cannot entirely 
discard potential region-specific trends which might bias our DiD estimates. In 
particular, it is conceivable that those areas exhibiting persistent increases in crime 
rates would likely have been eligible to participate in the program. If this was the 
case, our DiD estimates would be biased downwards, i.e. DiD models would 
understate the effects of the program, sometimes called “Ashenfelter’s dip” or “pre-
programme dip” (Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman & Smith, 1999).    
As regards inter-temporal effects, our results suggest that domestic burglary 














2007, where the estimated impact of the program is a reduction of about 17%. 
Looking now at the NRF impact on the other two indicators of property crime, i.e. 
vehicle crime and robbery, the results almost mirror our findings regarding domestic 
burglary; the positive impact of the NRF is particularly evident after 2003, reaching 
its peak in 2007, with an estimated reduction of crime victimization of about 16% 
and 33%, respectively. Regarding violent crime, our results suggest that the increase 
in both violence against the person and sexual offences was slower in areas receiving 
NRF funds from year 2002. The estimated dampening effect reaching its peak in 
2007 for violence and 2006 for sexual offences, where the estimated impact of the 
program is about -17% and -19%, respectively.  
 
4.2. Continuous treatment variable strategy 
Table 4 reports estimates for the continuous treatment variable strategy depicted in 
Eq. (3). The results suggest that the amount of NRF monies received by each local 
area is a non-trivial predictor of both property and violent crime. The size of the 
point estimates for the continuous treatment variable indicate that a £1 per capita 
increase in NRF funding is associated with a reduction in domestic burglary and 
vehicle crime of about 0.3%, and a reduction of 0.6% in robbery victimisation. 
Regarding violence against the person and sexual offences, point estimates suggest 
that additional funding is associated with a decrease of violent crime victimisation 
(in comparative terms) of about 0.3% and 0.5%, respectively.  On average, treated 
areas in our sample received each year £21.64 per capita in NRF monies, and so the 
coefficient estimates suggest an economically significant impact. 
 















4.3. Regression Discontinuity analysis 
We now turn to the effect of the NRF program on crime in the RD set up. First, 
Figure 4 depicts RD plots for property and violent crimes. These plots suggest a 
potential positive effect of the NRF program on property crime in England: the 
domestic burglary, vehicle crime and robbery plots show a downward discontinuity 
just at the right side of the threshold (or cut-off) vertical line. On the other hand, RD 
plots for violent crimes are less supportive of a positive program effect; although 
there seems to be a slight downward discontinuity around the threshold for both 
violent crime indicators, this discontinuity is not as evident as for property crimes.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Moving now to the regression results, Table 5 reports point estimates, and 
robust 95% confidence intervals for the local linear polynomial approach described 
in Eq. (6). In RD non-parametric analyses, the choice of bandwidths is an important 
matter, since those bandwidths define the weight assigned to each observation. 
Hence, we present a variety of RD estimates using mean square error (MSE) optimal 
bandwidths (hMSE) and coverage error rate (CER) optimal bandwidths (hCER), 
alternatively (for a detailed explanation of bandwidth selection alternatives see 
Calonico et al., 2017).   
Starting with the NRF effect on property crime, RD estimates indicate larger 
effects than DiD estimates; first, the estimated impact of the NRF program is a 
reduction of domestic burglary rates of about 42% (95% CI[-0.68, -0.25]) based on 














points to a decrease of about 43% (95% CI[-0.70, -0.19] ). Similarly, when looking at 
the NRF effect on vehicle crime rates, our results suggest again that the program did 
help to reduce the incidence of vehicle crime in areas receiving NRF funding. Based 
on MSE optimal bandwidths, the RD estimate is -0.2375 (95% CI[-0.44, -0.11]), 
which suggests that the NRF program reduced vehicle crime rates by about 24%. 
When using CER optimal bandwidths, the RD estimate for vehicle crime rates is 
again very similar (-0.2547; 95% CI[-0.47, -0.07]), hence giving us additional 
confidence in the robustness of our findings. The RD estimates of the impact of the 
NRF on robbery are again negative, suggesting a reduction of robbery rates of about 
67%-65% depending on the optimal bandwidth used. Turning to the results for 
violent crime reported in Table 5; Panel B. RD estimates for both types of violent 
crime, i.e. violence against the person and sexual offences are again negative. 
However, an analysis of the 95% CIs suggests that these estimates are not 
statistically different from zero in some specifications, particularly as regards sexual 
offences. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
One potential concern with the RD results presented thus far is the relatively 
low number of observations at each side of the threshold, which might bias our RD 
estimates. To alleviate this potential small sample bias, we propose to include in our 
models a set of pre-treatment covariates.  The inclusion of control covariates, though 
not necessary for identification purposes, may help to increase the precision of the 
RD estimates and might eliminate some of the small sample bias in cases where the 














Here, it is important to note that including covariates that might be affected by the 
treatment may bias RD estimates, hence just pre-treatment characteristics should be 
included as controls (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). Therefore, we report in Table 6 RD 
estimates including the baseline characteristics depicted in Table 1 (i.e., the average 
earnings of the employees in the area, the percentage of young people across 
different age categories, , the percentage of low skilled people, an indicator of ethnic 
diversity, population density, and an indicator of population concentration) taken 
from the UK Census 2001.  
Two important patterns emerge from Table 6; first, the estimated coefficients 
seem more pronounced across almost all model specifications when compared to RD 
estimates without controls. Second, the inclusion of additional control covariates 
seems to reduce the variance of our estimates, which now point to a statistically 
significant negative association between the NRF and property and violent crime 
rates in all model specifications.   
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
In addition to the results reported in this section, Appendix A and B include a 
series of further specifications to check our results’ sensitivity to alternative 
approaches to constructing the binding score and to alternative polynomial orders 
and other kernel functions. Firstly, we report RD estimates in Appendix A using 
different standardization approaches (Eq. 4) and different functional forms of Eq. 
(5). The results of our analysis do not seem to depend on the choice of binding score 
for property crime, with all alternative approaches producing similar results. For 














negative point estimates. In line with our baseline RD estimates including controls, 
the results are statistically different from zero (see Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3; Figure 
A.1). Finally, we report estimates of our RD model using different polynomial orders 
and other kernel functions in Appendix B. Table B.1 and B.2 show RD estimates 
considering a quadratic polynomial, and Tables B.3 and B.4 present non-parametric 
local linear estimates using Epanechnikov kernel functions, with Table B.5 and B. 
reporting non-parametric local linear estimates using Uniform kernel functions. 
Consistent with previous estimates, the results reported in Appendix B suggest that 
the NRF program had a positive effect in reducing property crime. As regards violent 
crime, most of these alternative RD estimates are negative and statistically 
significant in line with the previous results. 
Finally, although we are not aware of other policies that might have altered 
crime rates in the areas receiving NRF monies that perfectly overlapped in time and 
participants, 35 small neighbourhoods in 34 of our treated local areas and one 
neighbourhood in one of the control areas were also targeted by the New Deal for 
Communities (NDC).   
As part of the NSNR, the UK government announced the NDC program in 
1998, which had similar goals to the NRF, but was aimed specifically at about 1% of 
the most deprived neighbourhoods in England: 39 small areas of about 10,000 people 
each (Gutierrez Romero, 2009; Social Exclusion Unit, 2001). Although most NDC 
projects were implemented from 2002 onwards (Gutierrez Romero, 2009), hence 
clearly overlapping with the NRF, we believe that the potential effect of the NDC in 
our estimates should be minimal due to the narrow geographical scope of the NDC 
and its implementation via bespoke NDC neighbourhood partnerships. Nevertheless, 














baseline RD estimates (with and without control covariates) excluding those local 
areas where any small neighbourhood was selected for the NDC.  The exclusion of 
these local areas does not lead to a re-evaluation of our findings. 
In sum, there is evidence of a significant association between the NRF and 
property crime reductions; using a generalized DiD approach, we find that the NRF 
had substantial effects on reducing domestic burglary, vehicle crime and robbery. 
Taking advantage of the program eligibility rule and using a RD design, we find even 
larger e ects. Moreover, our continuous treatment variable strategy suggest that 
additional funding made a difference in terms of property crime reduction. Regarding 
violent crime, our findings point in the same direction. However, the latter results 
should be treated with caution, since the violent crime estimates are less robust to 
alternative model specifications; DiD and continuous treatment variable models 
affirm that the NRF was effective in preventing violent crime, but the estimated 
effects are not statistically different from zero in some RD specifications. 
Overall, it would appear that the activities made possible through the NRF 
contributed to a reduction in crime in the most deprived areas. This may in part 
reflect the impact of the program on education, health and employment outcomes in 
disadvantaged areas, but is also likely to be a result of the additional crime 
prevention initiatives that were undertaken by CDRPs in the areas receiving NRF 
monies. In particular, due to participation in the program CDRPs were able to 
support: security upgrades (e.g. the Street Lighting and Highway Signs PFI Project – 
Safer Sunderland Partnership, 2005); new youth diversion schemes (e.g. the Youth 
Inclusion Project - Barking & Dagenham Partnership, 2005); additional community 














2005), support services for offenders and victims of crime (the Rape Crisis Helpline - 
Leicester Partnership Against Crime & Disorder, 2005).12 
4.3. Less crime or displaced crime? 
A crucial issue in determining the effectiveness of the NRF in terms of crime 
reduction is whether crime relocates as a result of the activities that it funded, such as 
target hardening and enhancement of visible policing presence – what is usually 
referred to as crime displacement (Guerette & Bowers, 2009). Prior research suggests 
that crime reduction interventions can sometimes generate negative displacement 
effects of one kind or another (Barr & Pease, 1990). In this instance, it is conceivable 
that criminals operating in disadvantaged areas benefitting from the NRF simply 
switch their attention to neighbouring areas, which may be perceived to be more 
vulnerable or attractive options than their ‘home turf’. If criminal activity is indeed 
displaced from areas participating in the NRF program to adjacent areas, the overall 
effectiveness of the NRF in terms of crime reduction would be partly diminished.  
To test for crime displacement effects, we follow Delgado and Florax (2015) 
and deploy a spatial DiD model that accounts for potential spatial spillovers of 
program participation. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
  
where wij is an element of the spatial matrix (W) reflecting the relative connectivity 
between local areas. We present estimates based on a row-normalized spatial 
contiguity matrix (common border between local areas) and, to check the results’ 
sensitivity to alternative spatial matrices, we also report estimates based on a row-
normalized spatial inverse distance-squared matrix, where the magnitude of the 
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, comprehensive data on all of the initiatives undertaken by CDRPs are not publicly 
available, so we are unable to incorporate information on those activities directly into our research 














spatial interaction is measured by the squared inverse distance between the 
geographic centres of the studied areas. Hence, the potential local spatial spillover of 
receiving NRF funding would be that associated with the spatially lagged variable 
indicating program participation (θ).   
Table 7 presents results for the spatial DiD models. We find no evidence of 
displacement effects. On the contrary, our results suggest, overall, that there may 
exist what are known in the criminology literature as “diffusion benefits” (Bowers et 
al., 2011) or, in other words, that the benefits of crime reduction activities/policies 
may spread to neighbouring areas. These findings are in line with recent evidence 
suggesting that diffusion of crime prevention benefits is more likely to occur than 
spatial crime displacement (see, e.g. Bowers et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2014).  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In carrying out this study, we anticipated that rates of property and violent crimes 
would improve in disadvantaged areas receiving support for crime reduction 
activities through a major neighbourhood renewal program – the NRF. Using 
rigorous quasi-experimental techniques our results indicate that the NRF did indeed 
lead to lower crime rates in the most deprived local areas of England. Moreover, the 
crime reduction associated with the NRF is not only statistically significant, but 
substantively important. On average, the rate of victimisation from burglary, robbery 
and vehicle crime in areas receiving the NRF decreased by almost 30% during the 
study period (2000-2007). In addition, the rate of victimisation from violent crimes 














finding was less robust to alternative model specifications. These estimates therefore 
provide strong evidence of the potentially beneficial impact of neighbourhood 
renewal programs on rates of criminal activity in disadvantaged areas.   
 To date, research on the efficacy of preventative approaches to crime 
reduction is somewhat equivocal about the impact of such strategies (Nagin, 2013) – 
as too is empirical evidence on the effectiveness of neighbourhood renewal programs 
more generally (van Gent et al., 2009), and the NRF in particular (Lupton et al., 
2013). Whatever the merits of preventative and place-based approaches to crime 
reduction for generating feelings of community safety (Crawford & Evans, 2016), 
few studies provide robust analysis that demonstrate improvements in recorded crime 
rates. Our analysis indicates that disadvantaged areas can benefit from additional 
publicly funded crime prevention activities. This beneficial effect was particularly 
apparent in those areas that were only slightly more deprived than others failing to 
meet the eligibility criteria for the NRF. One important implication of this might 
therefore be that the most deprived areas require considerably more resources to 
match the rate of crime reduction achieved in less deprived areas - as our treatment 
intensity analysis also suggests. In addition, the activities aimed at reducing crime in 
disadvantaged areas appear to have had a range of positive ‘spillover’ effects on 
criminal behaviour and activity in more prosperous neighbouring areas. 
While the empirical strategy that we employ gives us considerable confidence 
in the results that we present, there are other aspects of crime reduction in local areas 
that we have not been able to fully incorporate within our research design. Firstly, as 
for evaluations of other place-based policies, it is not possible to accurately identify 
all the additional activities that were undertaken by CDRPs receiving NRF monies. 














safety strategies that are still available via The National Archives UK, but systematic 
information on how the NRF resources were allocated to specific initiatives is needed to 
facilitate a fine-grained understanding of the most (and least) effective interventions. 
Secondly, since criminal activity tends to be under-reported in recorded crime 
figures, the observable reductions in crime that we identify may actually 
underestimate the ‘true’ effect of the NRF on crime rates. Whether the activities 
supported by the NRF were associated with a complementary decrease in less serious 
property and violent crime is something that could usefully be explored through in-
depth case studies with police forces in England. Likewise, the impact of the NRF on 
the willingness of victims to report crimes to the local police force is something that 
would cast further valuable light on the nature of the evidence that we present. 
Thirdly, it is also possible that the fear of crime in disadvantaged areas decreased as 
a result of NRF-resourced interventions. Although perceptions of crime and recorded 
crime rates are not always correlated (Hale, 1996), subsequent research could seek to 
analyse the connection between the NRF, crime rates and fear of crime by drawing 
upon data sources capturing public attitudes towards criminal activity, such as the 
British Crime Survey. 
  In sum, this study indicates that it is possible to achieve desired outcomes 
through place-based interventions that provide local agencies with the resources 
needed to develop and implement additional preventative approaches to crime 
reduction. Although further investigation is required to identify the precise 
interventions through which agencies were able to achieve improved crime rates, 
there is strong reason to believe that the NRF was instrumental in enabling the 
implementation of these interventions. The finding that disadvantaged areas can 
benefit from neighbourhood renewal programs may therefore be a finding that is 
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Table 1. Characteristics of local areas from 2001 census. 
 
 All (N=345) Non-participants (N=264) Participants (N=81) 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Average earnings of residentsa 362.92 53.18 363.67 50.50 360.48 61.35 
Proportion of residents       
  between 25-29 years of age 6.14 1.47 5.85 1.15 7.09 1.93 
  between 20-24 years of age 5.46 1.65 5.13 1.48 6.50 1.74 
  between 15-19 years of age 6.07 0.60 5.95 0.55 6.45 0.60 
Proportion of low skilled 
residentsb 45.72 7.12 44.36 6.33 50.14 7.79 
Ethnic diversityc 1571.70 1631.45 1272.54 1120.48 2546.73 2461.64 
Population densityd 1287.02 1777.32 816.32 1082.72 2821.15 2572.00 
Population concentratione 21.83 7.86 19.63 4.82 29.00 11.00 
Notes: S.D. stands for standard deviation; (a) median gross weekly pay of full-time employees on a workplace 
basis (in British Pounds); (b) residents with no qualifications or only UK Level 1 qualifications; (c) the proportion 
of the different ethnic sub-groups within the local population identified in the UK national census was squared, 
and the sum of the squares was subtracted from 10,000, with a higher level of diversity reflected in a higher score 
of the index; (d) persons per Km2; (e) To construct this indicator, we gathered information on the population 
density for the 32482 English Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs). These LSOAs are a geographic 
disaggregation of our unit of analysis, i.e. English local areas that typically contain, on average, 1500 individuals 
each. An index of population concentration was then created for each local area by calculating the standard 
deviation of the population density of all the LSOAs within each area. Larger index values indicate that a larger 
share of the population is concentrated in a small number of neighbourhoods, whereas if the population were 
distributed evenly across a local area, the index value would be close to zero. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for crime data. 
 All (N=345) Non-participants (N=264) Participants (N=81) 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Criminal offences 2000-01       
Domestic burglary 15.19 9.80 11.72 6.18 26.30 10.93 
Vehicle crime 15.96 9.49 13.32 7.09 24.45 11.15 
Robbery 1.28 2.26 0.66 0.79 3.32 3.80 
Violence against the person 9.84 5.91 8.15 3.96 15.36 7.61 
Sexual offences 0.63 0.35 0.53 0.23 0.96 0.46 
       
Criminal offences 2002-07       
Domestic burglary 12.20 7.96 9.91 5.61 19.63 9.73 
Vehicle crime 12.41 6.92 10.68 5.47 18.03 8.07 
Robbery 1.21 1.81 0.72 0.78 2.81 2.93 
Violence against the person 16.26 7.15 14.25 5.68 22.82 7.52 
Sexual offences 1.00 0.45 0.89 0.38 1.34 0.48 
Notes: S.D. stands for standard deviation. Domestic burglary reflects the number of burglaries per 1,000 households. 
















Table 3. Difference-in-differences estimates. 
 A. Property crime  
 Domestic Burglary Vehicle Crime Robbery 
D estimate -0.1290 -0.0937 -0.2425 
 [-0.1839, -0.0740] [-0.1360, -0.0508] [-0.3067, -0.1782] 
N 2743 2746 2734 
Unit effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
 B. Violent crime  
 Violence Sexual offences  
D estimate -0.1214 -0.1556  
 [-0.2007, -0.0420] [-0.2241, -.0870]  
N 2760 2760  
Unit effects Yes Yes  
Time effects Yes Yes  
Notes: Robust 95% CI in brackets 
 
Table 4. Treatment intensity estimates. 
 A. Property crime  
 Domestic Burglary Vehicle Crime Robbery 
Treatment intensity -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0062 
 [-0.0052, -0.0001] [-0.0046, -0.0014] [-0.0088, -0.0036] 
N 2743 2746 2734 
Unit effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
 B. Violent crime  
 Violence Sexual offences  
Treatment intensity -0.0030 -0.0048  
 [-0.0057, -0.0002] [-0.0073, -0.0024]  
N 2760 2760  
Unit effects Yes Yes  
Time effects Yes Yes  















Table 5. Local polynomial RD estimates. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.4209 -0.4279  -0.2375 -0.2547  -0.6706 -0.6496 












N- / N+ 144/90 102/66  160/102 132/72  144/84 90/60 
H 0.1874 0.1279  0.2303 0.1572  0.1730 0.1181 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.0752 -0.1247  -0.0730 -0.0749    







0.0279]    
N- / N+ 144/84 90/66  312/156 192/114    
H 0.1801 0.1229  0.3757 0.2565    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 
coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
 
Table 6. Local polynomial RD estimates with covariates included. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.3511 -0.4369  -0.2899 -0.2940  -0.6520 -0.6462 












N- / N+ 221/126 149/102  297/138 184/114  222/132 156/102 
H 0.3064 0.2092   0.3579 0.2444   0.3215 0.2197 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1204 -0.1463  -0.2361 -0.2067    







-0.0797]    
N- / N+ 449/204 263/138  318/162 192/114    
H 0.4999 0.3413   0.3881 0.2650    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 















Table 7. Spatial difference-in-differences estimates. 
Estimates based on a spatial contiguity matrix 
 
 A. Property crime  
 Domestic Burglary Vehicle Crime Robbery 
D estimate -0.0923 -0.0411 -0.1301 
 [-0.1589, -0.0257] [-0.0930, 0.0107] [-0.2116, -0.0486] 
Spatially lagged D  -0.1000 -0.1427 -0.3053 
 [-0.2053, 0.0053] [-0.2312, -0.0542] [-0.4404, -0.1702] 
N 2743 2746 2734 
Unit effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
 B. Violent crime  
 Violence Sexual offences  
D estimate -0.0502 -0.0865  
 [-0.1340, 0.0337] [-0.1617, -0.01125]  
Spatially lagged D -0.1937 -0.1879  
 [-0.3326, -0.0549] [-0.3108, -0.0650]  
N 2760 2760  
Unit effects Yes Yes  
Time effects Yes Yes  
Estimates based on an inverse distance-squared matrix 
 
 A. Property crime  
 Domestic Burglary Vehicle Crime Robbery 
D estimate -0.0729 -0.0494 -0.1472 
 [-0.1370, -0.0088] [-0.0998, 0.0009] [-0.2292, -0.0652] 
Spatially lagged D  -0.2283 -0.1791 -0.3836 
 [-0.3721, -0.0844] [-0.3004, -0.0579] [-0.5723, -0.1950] 
N 2743 2746 2734 
Unit effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
 B. Violent crime  
 Violence Sexual offences  
D estimate -0.0620 -0.1066  
 [-0.1465, 0.0225] [-0.1822, -0.0310]  
Spatially lagged D -0.2413 -0.1990  
 [-0.4209, -0.0316] [-0.3732, -0.0248]  
N 2760 2760  
Unit effects Yes Yes  
Time effects Yes Yes  


















Figure 1. Total NRF allocation. This figure shows the spatial distribution of NRF monies (in 
British pounds per capita) received by each local area between years 2002 and 2007. The figure 
highlights that the average NRF allocation to treated areas over the period under study was 
£129.88 per capita (S.D. 86.44), which is a substantial amount of additional resource when the 
average local government expenditure per capita in each area across England at that time was 
















Figure 2. Crime variation in England (2002-2007). This figure shows the spatial distribution of crime rate variation  (in percentage 
















Figure 3. Lead and lag effects of the NRF on crime. Black dots represent point estimates and vertical 
bars show robust 95% CIs of the NRF impact on crime outcomes, estimated at the year of the 
effective implementation (year 2002; represented as t=0 in the figure), and for one year before and 

















Figure 4. Estimated impact of the NRF on crime rates; This figure shows standard RD plots for our 
five crime measures over the treatment period (2002-2007). Observations are averaged within bins 
using the mimicking variance evenly-spaced method described in Calonico et al. (2015). Each plot 
includes 4th order global polynomial fits represented by the solid lines. Plots are constructed using the 
















APPENDIX A: Sensitivity of RD estimates to different cut-off definitions 
The eligibility rule for participation in the NRF program is based on the deprivation 
level of local areas, measured using the six summary indices of the IMD2000. 
Deprivation is, therefore, assumed to be multidimensional. Such multidimensionality 
poses the fundamental question of how to integrate the six deprivation indices in a 
single binding score, which can provide a reliable multidimensional measure of 
deprivation. As described in the main text, eligible local areas are within the 50 most 
deprived areas for any of the indices incorporated in the IMD2000. Therefore, the 
UK government is implicitly imposing the so-called union approach (Duclos, Sanh & 
Younger, 2006) to measure multidimensional deprivation, i.e. a local area is 
considered multidimensionally deprived whenever it is deprived on at least one of 
the deprivation indices.  
To satisfy such a criterion, baseline results are computed using a measure of 
multidimensional deprivation constructed as the maximum absolute distance between 
the standardised indices and their standardised cut-off, given by the value of the 50th 
most deprived area for each of the indices (see Eq. 5). Although this approach has 
been used for similar purposes in previous studies (see, e.g., Reardon & Robinson, 
2012), there are no theoretical reasons for preferring it over other suitable functional 
forms. In particular, the maximum of the relative difference between the cut off and 
the standardized value of the indices can be used instead of the absolute one: 
 (A.1) 
where zik is the standardised value of the deprivation index k in local area i and z(50)k 
is the cut-off of index k. It should be noted that under this specification, the condition 














As regards the standardisation procedure, the baseline results are reported for 
the conventional method of subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation (Eq. 4). To investigate the robustness of our results to other standardization 
procedures, we consider an alternative method that yields individual indicators for 
each index ranging from zero (for the least deprived local area) to one (for the most 
deprived local area).  
 (A.2) 
where wik is the deprivation level of local area i for index k, while mink is the 
minimum of the index of deprivation k and maxk is its maximum.  
We combine different standardisation procedures and functional forms to 
analyse the effect of different binding scores on the impact of the NRF. Hence, we 
report RD estimates using different approaches to construct the running variable 
(Tables A.1 and A.2). We also report results without applying any standardisation to 
the separate indices of the IMD2000 and using Eq. (A.1) to construct the index of 
multidimensional deprivation (Table A.3). The use of this ratio yields dimensionless 
variables, thus making standardisation unnecessary. The results of the sensitivity 
analysis reported in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 confirm the positive effect of the NRF 
on property crimes. The effect size is slightly different depending on the structure of 
the deprivation measure, but its direction is robust to the different approaches used to 
construct the running variable. Although for violent crime the RD coefficients were 
not significant for the baseline results, the sensitivity analysis performed in this 
section points towards a positive impact of the NRF program in terms of violent 
crime prevention.  
[Table A.1 about here] 















One of the main limitations of the so-called “union approach” is that the 
overall level of multidimensional deprivation is assessed using only the variable 
which presents the highest level of deprivation. To illustrate the potentially 
misleading conclusions that can be reached under this approach, let us assume that 
two local areas are equally deprived in terms of unemployment, one of them is not 
deprived on the other dimensions at all, whereas the other is deprived on all 
dimensions, but less severely than in terms of unemployment. Under all of the 
specifications used so far, we would classify both areas as equally deprived, even 
when one exhibits arguably higher levels of deprivation than the other.  
Alternative strategies to the “union approach” have been adopted to 
determine eligibility for neighbourhood renewal funding in other countries. For 
example, the National Anti-Poverty Strategy in Ireland only considers a local area to 
be multidimensionally deprived if it is deprived across all dimensions (Layte, Nolan 
& Whelan, 2000) – the “intersection approach”. In our case, however, this approach 
would not identify program eligibility adequately. For this reason, we opt for an 
“intermediate approach” in which the joint distribution of all indices will be 
considered before identifying which local areas are deprived (Duclos & Tiberti, 
2016). To evaluate the level of deprivation, we use the overall index proposed by 
Bourguignon & Chakravarty (2003) given by: 
 (A.3) 
where gik are the individual indices of deprivation, constructed using Eq. (A.1) so 
that gik = zik/z(50)k. The overall index is defined only for non-negative values of gik. 














thus ensuring that the non-negative condition holds. γk stands for the weight of index 
k, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be the same for all dimensions.  The parameter 
ε determines the elasticity of substitution between different indices of deprivation 
(gik). For ε = 1, the indices are considered perfect substitutes, which means that 
deprivation on one index (say gi,unemployment = 1.1) can be compensated by the relative 
absence of deprivation on another (say gi,income = 0.9). As ε tends to infinity, the 
different indices become perfect complements, so Eq. (A.3) tends to 
 (A.4) 
The α parameter captures the degree of multidimensional deprivation, so that 
the larger the value, the higher the weight given to multidimensionally deprived 
areas. If we set α equal to one in Eq. (A.4), we get the particular case given by the 
union approach used to compute the results presented Table A.2.  
To analyse the sensitivity of the RD estimates to different degrees of 
substitutability between the indices of deprivation, we re-estimate Eq. (6) using Eq. 
(A.3) to construct the running variable for different values of the ε parameter and 
setting α = 1 in order to facilitate the comparison with previous results. Figure A.1 
presents the RD coefficients for both dimensions of crime, property and violent 
crime, and robust 95% confidence intervals for the non-parametric local polynomial 
model, using a triangular kernel and the optimal bandwidth selection that minimises 
the mean square error. As explained above, these estimates should converge, by 
definition, to the RD coefficients presented in Table A.2 (represented in Figure A.1 
by the dashed lines) because, when ε tends to infinity, the functional form used to 
construct the running variable of the RD estimates presented in this figure (Eq. A.3) 
tends to the expression of the running variable used to obtain the results presented in 














for the point estimates, the effect of the program does not differ depending on the ε 
parameter because the confidence intervals are wide enough to not reject the 
hypothesis of a constant effect.  














Table A.1. Local linear non-parametric RD estimates. Running variable constructed 
by using Eq. (A.1) and the standardisation formula given in Eq. (4). 
 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.4249 -0.4238  -0.2730 -0.2651  -0.7306 -0.7058 












N- / N+ 138 102  154 126  150 114 
H 90 72  96 78  90 72 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1242 -0.1214  -0.1145 -0.1580    







-0.0276]    
N- / N+ 156 126  168 132    
H 96 78  96 84    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 
coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
Table A.2. Local linear non-parametric RD estimates. Running variable constructed 
by using Eq. (A.1) and the standardisation formula given in Eq. (A.2). 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.3158 -0.3313  -0.2962 -0.2710  -0.8615 -0.5251 












N- / N+ 437 275  436 280  282 174 
H 96 90  96 90  90 72 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1143 -0.0760  -0.1669 -0.1881    







-0.0843]    
N- / N+ 354 198  432 258    
H 96 84  96 90    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 














Table A.3. Local linear non-parametric RD estimates. Running variable constructed 
by using Eq. (A.1) and non-standardised variables. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.2620 -0.3042  -0.2505 -0.2889  -0.9058 -0.8382 












N- / N+ 597 425  615 424  476 330 
H 108 96  108 96  96 90 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1072 -0.0881  -0.1291 -0.1863    







-0.0874]    
N- / N+ 426 270  582 384    
H 96 84  102 90    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 




































































































APPENDIX B: Additional robustness checks 
Table B.1. Quadratic RD estimates. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.4389 -0.4651  -0.2818 -0.2796  -0.8491 -0.6455 












N- / N+ 401/186 215/114  502/222 304/138  312/138 174/102 
H 0.4576 0.2959  0.5555 0.3591  0.3609 0.2334 
 B. Violent crime      
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1639 -0.047  -0.1518 -0.1335    







0.0260]    
N- / N+ 366/168 192/114  402/174 216/114    
H 0.4142 0.2677  0.4492 0.2904    
Notes: RD estimates computed using quadratic polynomial methods with triangular kernel function. 
Bias-corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014).  Optimal 
bandwidth selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector 
(hMSE); coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
 
Table B.2. Quadratic RD estimates with covariates included. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.3699 -0.4237  -0.2955 -0.2831  -0.7191 -0.6862 












N- / N+ 538/240 329/162  394/186 214/114  318/162 192/114 
H 0.6219 0.4022   0.4566 0.2953   0.3868 0.2503 
 B. Violent crime      
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1332 -0.1036  -0.2215 -0.2834    







-0.0993]    
N- / N+ 414/192 222/120  306/156 186/114    
H 0.4660 0.3013   0.3776 0.2441    
Notes: RD estimates computed using quadratic polynomial methods with triangular kernel function. 
Bias-corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014).  Optimal 
bandwidth selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector 














Table B.3. Local linear RD estimates; Epanechnikov kernel function. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.4384 -0.4238  -0.2301 -0.2774  -0.6190 -0.5813 












N- / N+ 144/84 90/66  148/102 120/66  144/90 102/66 
H 0.1786 0.122  0.2176 0.1486  0.1848 0.1262 
 B. Violent crime      
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.0838 -0.1165  -0.0622 -0.0672    







0.0275]    
N- / N+ 132/78 78/60  312/156 192/114    
H 0.1590 0.1085  0.3792 0.2589    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with Epanechnikov kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 
coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
 
Table B.4. Local linear RD estimates; Epanechnikov kernel function with covariates 
included. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.3537 -0.4771  -0.2819 -0.3327  -0.6175 -0.6507 












N- / N+ 215/114 144/90  220/132 154/102  263/138 168/102 
H 0.2876 0.1964   0.3205 0.2189   0.3409 0.2329 
 B. Violent crime      
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1411 -0.1526  -0.2355 -0.1996    







-0.0799]    
N- / N+ 318/162 192/114  306/156 192/114    
H 0.3821 0.2609   0.3719 0.2539    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with Epanechnikov kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 














Table B.5. Local linear RD estimates; uniform kernel function. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.4348 -0.4431  -0.2600 -0.2655  -0.8197 -0.7355 












N- / N+ 138/78 84/60  144/84 96/66  114/66 60/48 
H 0.1647 0.1124  0.1826 0.1246  0.1297 0.0886 
 B. Violent crime      
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1448 -0.0879  -0.0647 0.0194    







0.1147]    
N- / N+ 102/66 60/42  222/126 150/102    
H 0.1267 0.0865  0.305 0.2082    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with uniform kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 
coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
 
Table B.6. Local linear RD estimates; uniform kernel function with covariates 
included. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.3591 -0.7090  -0.2457 -0.3873  -0.6115 -0.6372 












N- / N+ 161/102 132/72  190/114 144/84  306/156 192/114 
H 0.2305 0.1574   0.2533 0.1730   0.3674 0.2510 
 B. Violent crime      
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1339 -0.0981  -0.2624 -0.2204    







-0.0978]    
N- / N+ 216/120 150/96  192/114 144/84    
H 0.2993 0.2043   0.2647 0.1808    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with uniform kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 














APPENDIX C: RD estimates excluding local areas where any neighbourhood 
was selected for participation in the NDC. 
Table C.1. Local polynomial RD estimates. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.4635 -0.4253  -0.2718 -0.2727  -0.7395 -0.6543 












N- / N+ 138/84 102/60  160/96 132/72  114/60 72/54 
H 0.1840 0.1263   0.2324 0.1595   0.1439 0.0988 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1013 -0.1156  -0.1397 -0.2114    







-0.0613]    
N- / N+ 138/78 90/54  138/84 114/60    
H 0.1716 0.1177   0.1967 0.1350    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 
coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
Table C.2. Local polynomial RD estimates with covariates included. 
 A. Property crime     
 Domestic burglary  Vehicle crime  Robbery 
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER 
RD coefficient -0.3674 -0.4332  -0.3115 -0.3228  -0.5939 -0.6121 







-0.1858]  [-0.7608, -0.4242] [-0.7963, -0.4076] 
N- / N+ 215/126 149/96  298/132 184/108  275/126 180/102 
H 0.3189 0.2190   0.3650 0.2506   0.3502 0.2406 
 B. Violent crime     
 Violence  Sexual offences   
 hMSE hCER  hMSE hCER     
RD coefficient -0.1525 -0.1407  -0.2201 -0.2311    







-0.0609]    
N- / N+ 306/132 186/108  186/108 138/78    
H 0.3807 0.2613   0.2615 0.1795    
Notes: RD estimates computed using local linear methods with triangular kernel function. Bias-
corrected robust estimators of standard errors developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Optimal bandwidth 
selection relies on two different procedures: mean square error optimal bandwidth selector (hMSE); 
coverage error rate optimal bandwidth (hCER) (see Calonico et al. 2015). 
